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Abstract 
 
Spiraling health care costs have posed a threat to access to health care for scheme 
members, as more has to be done with even less. Managed care programmes were 
introduced to control the health care costs by reducing medical doctors autonomy. My 
aim was to ascertain the extent to which the managed care processes impede medical 
doctors’ autonomy. Principled conditions were identified where the limitation of 
doctors’ autonomy as a result of managed care could be morally justified which 
include where implementation would result in a just distribution of resources and a 
limitation of medically futile treatment. 
However principled conditions where these managed care tools would not ethically be 
justified included where they would result in adverse patient outcomes, where they 
result in a loss of medical doctors morale or where they result in reduced trust in the 
patient doctor relationship. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
In an open letter to key stake holders in the public and private health care sectors, 
Grobler (2013) highlights some of the difficulties medical specialists are experiencing 
due to health management policies which he feels are impeding the doctor-patient 
relationship. He goes on further to claim that these policies risk ruining clinical 
medicine, diminishing clinical autonomy and compromising patients’ well being.   
The concerns expressed do not apply to medical specialists alone, but have also been 
expressed by medical doctors in other fields (Venter, 2004). The views expressed are 
those of mistrust and hostility towards managed care policies.   
 
The Medical Schemes Act governs private health care funding in South Africa. The 
Act has Regulations that guide medical schemes in their implementation of managed 
care. The regulation defines managed care as:  
An arrangement through which utilization of health care is monitored through 
the use of mechanisms which are designed to monitor appropriateness, 
promote efficacy, quality and cost effectiveness of the delivery of relevant 
health services (Regulations in Terms the Medical Schemes Act, 1999:4). 
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Some of the tools or mechanisms that are used to provide managed health care 
include formularies, clinical protocols, and provider contracts. The intention of 
implementing these managed care tools is—at the end of the day —to ensure that 
health services are delivered within a framework that marries best clinical outcomes 
with cost effectiveness. The implementation of these tools has been denounced by 
some Medical Doctors who have argued that these have increased their administrative 
burden and pose a threat to their clinical autonomy (Grobler, 2013; Venter, 2004). 
 
In the light of the controversy surrounding managed health care, I propose in this 
research report to normatively assess the impact of current Managed Health Care 
practices in South Africa on the professional autonomy of medical doctors.  My aim is 
to ascertain the extent to which the managed care processes impede medical doctors’ 
autonomy and to evaluate whether these impediments are ethically justifiable. 
 
1.2. Rationale and Importance of the Study 
 
Recognition of the importance of the right kind of patient-doctor relationship dates far 
back in time, and a fundamental ethical imperative for any medical doctor has always 
been to put his or her patient first at all times. Managed care poses a new ethical 
dilemma for medical doctors, as doctors now often find themselves having to choose 
between putting their patient’s best interest first or making financially beneficial 
decisions.  The nature of the patient-doctor relationship is highly dependent on 
maintaining trust between the treating medical doctor and their patient. Managed care 
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could be seen as a threat to this trust relationship, since patients could come to doubt 
that their well being is being given priority. 
 
Medical doctors’ (professional) autonomy is one of most important factors 
contributing towards their professionalism. It is important that their professional 
autonomy is safeguarded, as it is a source of pride for many physicians, is an essential 
factor in Medical doctors’ job satisfaction, and it enables doctors to perform their 
professional duties with confidence. Medical doctors’ motivation and job satisfaction 
is essential for ensuring good patient-doctor relationships and provision of a good 
health care service. It is clear that if medical doctors’ professional autonomy is not 
protected, we risk poor health outcomes for many patients. Professional Autonomy is 
an essential component of job satisfaction for medical doctors and some have equated 
an attack on medical professional autonomy as an attack on the profession itself 
(Grobler, 2013;  Holsinger  and Beaton, 2006). Whilst the principles that form the 
foundation of managed care are necessary and justified (efficient resource utilization), 
we need to be alert to the fact that these managed care processes can have a 
detrimental effect on patient medical outcomes and this must be safeguarded against. 
 
It is, therefore, important to seek to establish in what ways doctors’ professional 
autonomy is impeded by managed health care practices, and to establish a principled 
basis on which to ethically evaluate the extent to which such impediments of 
autonomy are morally justifiable. This will enable me to propose guidelines for 
managed health practice. 
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Whilst internationally studies have been done and papers have been written around 
this subject, little work has been done which focuses on the issue specifically in the 
South African context.  My research will add to the body of knowledge relating to this 
topic in South Africa. 
 
1.3. Overview of the Literature 
 
In this section, I briefly discuss some of the existing literature that is of relevance to 
my question and which I will need to draw on in my research. 
Autonomy is defined as the freedom to independently rule or govern oneself without 
control from somebody else (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2010). 
 
There is a strong emphasis in the literature on certain standards that the medical 
profession needs to live up to if it is to maintain its status as a profession (Hargraves, 
Reed and Vratil, 2001). These include professionals putting the interests of their 
patients above theirs, maintaining an ethical and moral standard that is beyond 
reproach, endeavoring to continue with personal development, and having a system in 
place where members of the profession can be held accountable. For as long as these 
criteria are met the profession will be allowed to maintain the autonomy that it enjoys 
(Swick, 2000). It is widely accepted that this autonomy should have boundaries; it 
can’t mean that medical doctors are free to do as they please. A difficult question to 
answer would be how much autonomy do medical doctors need in order to provide 
good healthcare? For instance, medical doctors’ clinical autonomy is essential in 
allowing doctors the freedom to deviate from medical guidelines when faced with 
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patients that are non-responders to guideline protocols (Morreim, 2002).  Autonomy 
for medical doctors allows the profession to not only self-regulate by setting its own 
standards but also allows medical doctors to make independent clinical decisions 
(Hargraves, Reed and Vratil, 2001). 
 
Kronebusch, Schlesinger and Thomas (2009) looked at managed care’s impact on 
physicians’ perceived utilization constraints, clinical interactions and clinical practice 
autonomy in the United States of America They did this by comparing physicians 
working in States which had adopted managed care regulations versus those working 
in States which had not adopted these regulations  
Their findings showed that medical doctors who were more exposed to a greater 
degree of managed healthcare organizations complained of greater impeding of their 
clinical autonomy, decreased quality of their interactions with patients and decreased 
ability to get further clinical services as compared with medical doctors who were less 
exposed (Kronebusch, Schlesinger and Thomas, 2009). 
 
In Mexico a similar study was conducted which compared Family Physicians who 
were working in environments with varying degrees of exposure to managed care 
processes. Again it was found that there was an inverse relationship in the physicians’ 
perception of professional autonomy when compared with their working 
environment’s exposure to managed health care processes (García-Peña et al., 2000). 
Waddimba et al. (2010) looked at the compliance rate to evidence based guidelines by 
primary care physicians working in a health management environment. Again they 
showed that the attitude to compliance to the guidelines had an inverse relationship to 
perceived clinical autonomy. In Switzerland a similar study to assess physicians’ 
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attitudes towards managed health care tools was done, and again the physicians 
expressed that the managed care tools impeded their clinical autonomy to varying 
degrees. What was of interest, though, was that in this study the attitude towards 
guidelines was a positive one (Deom et al., 2010); this in comparison to other studies 
which had found that physicians perceived guidelines to be a hindrance to clinical 
autonomy.   
 
Blume (1997) writes that managed care has posed a new ethical dilemma for medical 
doctors as they are becoming increasingly caught between autonomous clinical 
decisions based on their patients’ best interest and the restrictions placed upon them 
by these managed care tools. Meyers (1999) acknowledges that the managed health 
care tools have posed an ethical conflict for physicians, but he argues that that the 
ethical conflicts presented are not new in the history of medicine and do not pose a 
threat to the traditional doctor-patient relationship. The same sentiments are echoed 
by Mechanic (2000) who also argues that there will be a need to review the ethical 
approach in resolving this dilemma for physicians. 
 
1.4. Aim and Research Questions 
 
The aim of my research is:  
To normatively assess the impact of current Managed Health Care practices in South 
Africa on the professional autonomy of medical doctors. 
 
In seeking to fulfill this aim, I will address the following research questions: 
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1. What is meant by the notion of the professional autonomy of doctors and why is it 
an important ethical consideration? 
2. In what ways do current Managed Health Care Practices in SA impede medical 
doctors’ professional autonomy? 
3. In what ways are impediments of doctors’ professional autonomy resulting from 
current Managed Health Care Practices in SA ethically justifiable, and in what 
ways are they not? 
4. What guidelines can be proposed that would assist in ensuring that Managed 
Health Care practices do not unjustifiably impede the professional autonomy of 
doctors? 
 
1.5. Research Objectives 
 
The following are the main objectives of my study: 
i. To give an account of the notion of the professional autonomy of 
Medical Doctors and of its ethical importance 
ii. To identify ways in which Managed Health Care Practices in SA 
impede medical doctors’ professional autonomy 
iii. To identify principled conditions under which impediments of Medical 
Doctors’ professional autonomy would be morally justified and 
principled conditions under which they would not 
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iv. To normatively evaluate the impediments of doctors’ professional 
autonomy resulting from current Managed Health Care Practices in SA 
in terms of the principled conditions identified in (iii) above 
 
2.  AN ACCOUNT OF THE NOTION OF THE PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY 
OF MEDICAL DOCTORS AND OF ITS ETHICAL IMPORTANCE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will define professional autonomy with regards to the medical 
profession and then demonstrate the important role that professional autonomy plays. 
I will do this by first highlighting the role that professional autonomy plays as 
evidence as to why it is important. I will then compare these findings with the 
findings of detractors of professional autonomy.  
 
Immanuel Kant noted that human beings have an intrinsic value which put them high 
above all creation, because of this intrinsic value we should never use them as a mere 
means to an end (Rachels and Rachels, 1987). As rational beings each human has his 
or her own ambitions, thoughts, and actions, which are guided by reason. As moral 
agents if we are to respect the rule of never using them a means to an end we should 
then respect their independent thinking and promote it.   
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Autonomy is best described as ones ability to self-rule or self govern (Dhai and 
McQuoid-Mason, 2011).  
 
A profession is defined as a field of work that requires specialized training, mostly 
related to one that needs an advanced education (Oxford Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary 2010, 1159). 
 
Professional autonomy thus would then be best described as a profession’s ability to 
self-rule and self regulate. The World Medical Association describes two key levels 
concerning Medical Doctors’ professional autonomy. 
The first is at an individual level, where each medical doctor should be free to make 
professional decisions on the management and treatment options when with his or her 
patients. The second is at the level of the group of medical doctors. The profession as 
a whole should be free to regulate itself, setting its own standards and being 
responsible for the professional conduct of its members (The World Medical 
Association, 1987). 
 
The importance of Professional autonomy would be best appreciated by grasping the 
importance of clinical freedom at an individual level and the importance of self-
regulation at a professional group level for medical doctors. 
 
2.2. Autonomy and Trust  
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To grasp the importance of clinical freedom one would have to reflect on the code of 
ethics that guide the individual medical professional. From the days of Hippocrates 
medical doctors have been making a public oath to treat their patients to the best of 
their skill and knowledge (Perkin, 1980) . The World Medical Association makes 
mention that medical doctors should always place the health of their patients as a 
priority and that no financial, social or medical matter should interfere with this duty 
(The World Medical Association, 2009) . The Health Professions Council of South 
Africa also reiterates that medical doctors have a moral duty to place their patients 
best interests as a priority (The Health Professions Council of South Africa, 1982) . 
Other ethical obligations to patients include not to harm the patient and to respect the 
self-determination of all patients (The Health Professions Council of South Africa, 
1982) .  
These ethical obligations are at the core of the doctor patient relationship.  
 
The patient-doctor relationship is like no other service provider and client 
relationship. The medical doctor is the expert in a field of science; his client usually 
has minimal knowledge of this science. The sheer complexity of the interactions 
between physiology and pathology on ones anatomy resulting in the presenting 
symptoms means that whilst the patient may perhaps want to get better clarity on the 
treatment plan more often than not he or she would not be able to fully appreciate the 
gravity of the situation and more often than not is reliant on the expert service 
provider’s opinion. The client approaches the doctor in hope for a cure for his or her 
symptoms or disease and is fully aware that the medical doctor at times wields the 
power of life or death (Matthews , 1982).   
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In this relationship there is a big aspect of trust that the service provider is competent 
and makes the correct life saving decisions.   
  
Trust in the doctor patient relationship has been shown to be instrumental in 
determining patient health outcomes (Hall et al., 2001) . Trust has a direct impact on 
patient behavior, where there is trust patients are more likely to consult a medical 
doctor about their ailments, reveal more about their ailments during consultations, 
adhere to the prescribed treatment plans from their doctor, have an improved placebo 
effect and return for review appointments, remain loyal to their treating doctor thus 
improving continued care (Becker and Roblin, 2008; Davies and Rundall, 2000). 
 
Mechanic highlights five dimensions of trust in the patient doctor relationship which 
are that patients trust that their treating physician is appropriately skilled to do his job, 
that he will always act in the patient’s best interest, he has control over the 
environment which will allow for optimal care, he will uphold the patients 
confidentiality and that the treating doctor will disclose all the necessary information 
to allow the patient to make a fully informed decision this is not limited to just the 
disclosure pertaining to the treatment plan but also inclusive of financial interests 
which may later give rise to questions of conflicts of interest (Mechanic, 1998) . 
 
Trust is the underlying substance that gives the patient doctor relationship meaning. 
Medical doctors have an ethical imperative to place their patients health as a priority 
and this should be done without undue influence. Professional autonomy should be 
safeguarded to avert the erosion of trust between the medical doctor and his patient. 
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2.3. Physician Autonomy and the Retaining Of Professionals  
 
Autonomy has been shown to play a significant role in physician job satisfaction 
(Scheurer et al, 2009). The shortage of doctors in South Africa, including their 
departure for ‘greener pastures’ has been a topic of great concern to the department of 
health and the general public alike. Hudson (2011), noted the dire situation that the 
country was in with shortages not only in the public sector but also the private sector. 
The doctor shortage was starting to have a negative impact on patient care even 
within the private sector where less qualified personal were doing procedures which 
risk patient care being compromised.. The push factors that resulted in doctors 
departing from practice in South Africa were more important than the pull factors. 
Whilst the departure of doctors from South Africa is multifactorial amongst these 
factors includes job satisfaction (Bezuidenhout et al, 2009). The sense of having 
autonomy was a positive contributor to the doctors’ job satisfaction. Schultz and 
Schultz, 1988 demonstrated the relationship between physician autonomy and job 
satisfaction. That perceived autonomy played a significant role in job satisfaction for 
medical doctors.  This was also demonstrated amongst British general practitioners 
(Cooper et al, 1989).  Pillay (2008) demonstrated that within the South African 
private health care sector job satisfaction was greatly influenced by having a sense of 
autonomy.  
 
15 
 
2.4. Physician Autonomy and Physician Stress Management  
 
Physician autonomy has been shown to be an essential stress management tool for 
doctors. Autonomy serves as protection against the high stress and pressured 
environment that doctors find themselves practicing in. For as a long there is a 
perceived measure of autonomy doctors are able to cope with this testing 
environment, however as the doctor’s autonomy is reduced so does the their ability to 
cope with their environment (Sutherland and Cooper, 1992). One of the consequences 
to of this increased stress was to the usage of sick leave, where doctors are taking 
days off not because of acute illness but rather to recuperate from the increased stress 
(Virtanen et al, 2008). 
 
The price paid for physician job dissatisfaction can be extremely high. Dissatisfied 
physicians may experience loss of income and health problems. The dissatisfied 
physician may also cut their working hours, leave their places of work and also retire 
early from clinical work (Quinn et al, 2009).   
 
Because  physician autonomy is closely related to physician job satisfaction one can 
note that physician autonomy then plays an important role in the physician mental 
well being, retention at work and also a longer career where physicians are able to 
serve the public. 
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2.5. Job Satisfaction and Patient Outcomes 
 
Patient satisfaction has been shown to be linked to physician satisfaction.  (Linn et al, 
1985). DeVoe et al (2007) demonstrated that amongst the factors that were 
responsible for the overall patient satisfaction with their experience of the health 
system, physician satisfaction had a large role to play. Patient perceived satisfaction is 
an important determinant of treatment outcomes as it governs patients health seeking 
behavior, for instance the patients willingness to adhere to treatment plans and follow 
up instructions. A lack of co-operative behavior from the patient may nullify the 
treatment actions of his doctor (Schneider and Ulrich, 2008). If autonomy is an 
essential factor in physician job satisfaction and physician job satisfaction is related to 
patient satisfaction then one may infer that physician autonomy is essential in patient 
satisfaction also and that compromising physician autonomy may result in physician 
dissatisfaction and which will also translate into patient dissatisfaction. Patient 
dissatisfaction will result in not only poor health outcomes for the individual patient 
but also risks adding an additional burden to the health system due to duplication of 
services and resultant increased wasteful expenditure by the health system. Thus 
physician autonomy also plays a role in the determination of patient satisfaction and 
related to that the patients’ health outcomes. Weakening physician autonomy may 
have the unintended consequence of dissatisfied patients and poor health outcomes as 
a result.  
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2.6. Physician Autonomy and Patient Responsibility 
 
Medical doctors are fully responsible for their patients’ treatment plan. This is more 
evident in the case of medical litigation when the desired treatment has not gone 
according to plan and there are undesired consequences as a result there of (Sacristán, 
2010). This setting reminds us of the importance of the respect of the attending 
physicians’ autonomy as the burden of responsibility ultimately lies on him.  
Physician autonomy is part and parcel of accountability (Timmermans, 2005).   
 
Restrictions to medical autonomy arise from the fact that health is developing as a 
public good (Leenen, 1985). Similarly in relation to medical schemes, health becomes 
the good of the population that is covered by the scheme. As such there is an 
obligation by the scheme in the setting of limited resources to make sure that these 
resources serve the needs of the insured population and that these services are in line 
with the ideals of the scheme. As a result thereof will be policy development by 
schemes that will be at loggerheads with the autonomy of medical professionals.    
 
Dupuis 2000 argues against professional autonomy citing three main points: 
1. Whilst the actions of doctors are based on certain values and these actions 
may at times result in some sort of ethical discussion this in no way infers 
that medical doctors are moral experts. Instead Dupuis argues further that 
medical doctors are not moral experts and lack ethical training and insight. 
2. Actions of medical doctors are not always in the best interest of the patient 
as most of the therapeutic interventions in fact have demonstrated a neutral 
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effect and have proven dangerous when instituted against incorrect 
indications. 
3. Wide inter-doctor variance suggesting a weak scientific basis for medicine 
and over-servicing of patients for financial gain. 
 
Hampton (2011) similarly argued against the clinical autonomy of doctors citing that 
for too long it has been used as a cover allowing medical doctors to give patients 
treatment which was not beneficial and not based on any science.  He argues that in 
the setting of restricted resources clinical autonomy should be removed and only 
treatment of proven value should be considered.  
Whilst it is reasonable and correct that non-beneficial therapy should not be 
administered to patients the answer is not really through the out right removal of 
clinical autonomy.   
 
Clinical autonomy does not merely mean that doctors should be free to do as they 
please, but that their clinical decisions should take place without undue influence 
from external parties. 
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that physician autonomy plays a vital role within 
the health care sector. It not only is a historical right that has been given to physicians 
by society based on their complex studies but also is an essential glue in the patient 
doctor trust relationship. It is also a necessary component of physician sense of self-
esteem and sense of self worth, this is demonstrated in the role that autonomy 
contributes to physician job satisfaction and stress management. Autonomy then also 
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becomes essential in patient satisfaction. Thus the whole medical ecosystem benefits 
from the upholding of physician autonomy. Those that have argued against physician 
autonomy have only done so from the narrow perspective of wasteful expenditure 
from unnecessary interventions from medical doctors. Their arguments however fail 
to consider the other contributions of autonomy outside of the doctor making a 
decision that results in an unnecessary treatment. They fail to consider the 
consequences of the dissatisfied physician and how that may lead to less doctors 
being available to the health system, thus limiting patient access to care, or the 
dissatisfied patient where trust in the patient doctor relationship which results in poor 
patient compliance, duplication of services and ultimately increased health care costs. 
Physician autonomy serves a vital role in the maintenance of physician job 
satisfaction and contributes not only to the trust relationship between doctors and 
patients which is at the core of the physician patient relationship but also contributes 
to improved health outcomes as patients are more likely to follow their doctors' 
treatment plans. 
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3. WAYS IN WHICH MANAGED HEALTH CARE PRACTICES IN SOUTH 
AFRICA IMPEDE MEDICAL DOCTORS’ PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The doctor patient relationship encompasses a wide range of interactions between the 
medical doctor and his or her patient. The interactions can take place in the public or 
privately funded sector. Within the privately funded sector this may or may not 
involve funding from a health insurance company. The interactions range from the 
planned appointment in the medical doctors rooms to the emergency procedure in 
theatre.  
  
 This chapter will focus on the private healthcare setting and interactions with patients 
who are covered by a health insurance product.  In most of these interactions there 
will be a need to involve the health care funder to get an approval of some sort for 
funding. This chapter will seek to identify a few circumstances where managed health 
care may impede medical doctors’ autonomy. 
 
Managed care programmes were introduced by health insurance funders and 
government in an attempt to control what was then perceived as spiraling private 
health care cost (Rimler and Morisson, 1993).  
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These managed care programs took many forms which included drug formularies, 
disease management protocols, and hospital and service provider networks. 
 
3.2. Drug Formularies 
 
Most medical schemes in South Africa employ a closed medical formulary (Motheral 
and Henderson, 1999/2000, 481), which means that they have a set of prescribed 
drugs that they fund for. Drugs outside of this list can attract a copayment or not be 
funded for at all if prescribed.   
  
Rucker and Schiff (1990) describe the ideal formulary as having the following 
characteristics:  
Drug inclusion based on proven drug safety profile and its efficacy 
Where necessary alternatives to the first choice drugs have to be included 
Unnecessary pharmacological duplication should be avoided and drugs of 
inferior class or efficacy should be excluded 
Drug inclusion should be based on a good balance between cost effectiveness 
and quality patient care.  
 
Moore and Newman (1993) note that drug formularies are employed as a means of 
restricting physician choice of the drug they want to prescribe and rather forces them 
into prescribing cheaper alternative drugs and revising their prescription behavior. 
They further suggest that it has been argued that the underlying basis for the 
introduction of formularies is that medical doctors opt for the more expensive newer 
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drugs due to lack of knowledge and being overcome by the marketing and promises 
of drug companies.   
 
The difficulty with the limited drug formulary is that finding the appropriate agent for 
a patients chronic condition can at times prove to be a difficult path filled with trial 
and error as the treating doctor and patient find the correct drug or combination of 
drugs that yield (Harding Et al, 1985).  
 
Drug formularies may also have the undesired consequence of resulting in poor health 
outcomes as drugs are excluded on the basis of cost and not effectiveness. Thus 
patients are not able to make an out of pocket purchase of the effective drug resulting 
in poorer health outcomes (Moore and Newman). The consequence then is that whilst 
the cost of drug expenditure comes down there is a resultant rise in other costs within 
the health system as patients now need to be treated for their poorer health condition, 
often at a higher cost than the initial cost of the drugs (Bloom and Jacobs, 1985). 
 
3.3. Treatment Protocols 
 
Managed care companies use treatment protocols as a means of containing costs in 
the treatment of specific conditions. These are prescribed treatment guidelines that the 
treating doctor should not deviate from if funding is to be authorized (Eastman, 
Eastman and Tolson, 2001: 211). The guidelines are implanted as an evidence based 
and cost effective option for managing a patient with a particular diagnosis. In general 
these prescribed guidelines are more than adequate for the average patient.  
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Treatment guidelines have been criticized as lacking applicability in normal everyday 
working due to limitations of their design (Grol et al. 2010, 395). They are designed 
for an ideal patient generally presenting with only a single complaint, they do not 
factor in that patients may present with more than one problem at time and that 
patients want to be involved in the decisions that affect their health. 
 
Guideline development is usually based on cost effective analyses that may be flawed 
in certain special patient groups. The measurable scientific outcomes may unfairly 
bias against important immeasurable outcomes that the treating doctor and patient are 
aiming for. This becomes problematic if the basis for funding from managed care 
providers is based on these guidelines as this may inadvertently force medical doctors 
to these immeasurable outcomes that are essential for patient well-being (Berghmans 
et al., 2004). Norheim (1999) described guidelines as a means of restricting 
potentially useful treatment to a patient.  
 
3.4. Utilization Management 
 
Utilization management involves pre-authorization of non-emergency admissions, 
anticipated expensive treatment plans, expensive treatments and prolonged and or 
expensive admissions (Fairfield et al. 2007). An example of utilization management 
would be the review of a high cost admission by the managed care organization’s case 
manager, who would work to minimize the costs of the admission by finding cost 
effective treatment alternatives and limiting the length of the admission.  
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3.5. Preferred Provider Networks 
 
Preferred provider networks relate to a network of doctors and facilities that are 
contracted to the health management organization to render a service at a discounted 
or fixed amount, in return the organization ‘guarantees’ a certain amount of traffic to 
these doctors that make the agreement economically profitable. Members of these 
schemes then are encouraged to make use of these network, with incentives of that 
include having the service being fully funded by the scheme. Patients are not 
restricted to seeing providers outside of the network but are discouraged with either a 
co-payment or at times having to pay for the entire service out of their own pocket. 
 
Individual schemes have networks that may encompass the following providers: 
• General practitioners; schemes will employ a network of general practitioners. 
Individual patients are then encouraged to only use general practitioners 
within this network. Within the network there could also be restrictions placed 
on movement between general practitioners. 
• Specialist; schemes can also employ a network of specialist doctors that their 
members can be referred to. The process can also be further restricted that first 
an authorization must be given by the scheme before the patient sees the 
specialist within the network. The scheme can refuse to fund or impose a co-
payment if the patient sees the specialist without the authorization.   
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• Hospitals: schemes can also establish networks with different hospitals or 
health facilities where there is an agreement that the schemes patients are 
charged discounted rates. The consequence though is that patients are then 
encouraged to use these network facilities. If patients go out of network then 
co-payments may be imposed. 
  
Historically patients would present to their treating doctor with a particular ailment 
requesting assistance from their doctor. The attending doctor would apply his/her 
knowledge and introduce a treatment plan based on multiple inputs including his /her 
knowledge and experience. This is viewed as a more individualized treatment plan. 
The problem with this is that whilst treating doctors were free to make autonomous 
decisions on management plans for their patients it led to wide variation in treatment 
that had varying outcomes for the patients. The above-mentioned managed care tools 
are meant to minimize the variation in treatment plans by limiting the choice that 
treating doctors have on the treatment plan.  
 
The managed care tools remove individualization and replace it with a more 
standardized approach (Timmerman and Oh, 2010). Compliance with these tools is 
enforced through punitive measures for the patient or threats of non re-imbursement 
for the doctor. Thus if a doctor still wants to persue a particular non funded drug or 
treatment then the patient is forced to foot the bill themselves or the doctor has to go 
through lengthy authorization processes (Moore and Newman, 1993). Patients and 
Doctors may enjoy one hundred percent funding if the above-mentioned tools are 
complied with. However where there is deviation from these protocols and doctors 
 
26 
exercise their autonomy in prescribing a treatment plan as they see suitable may result 
in adverse financial consequences for the doctor or patients. The patients may be 
subjected to co-payment or no payment at all for the treatment strategy (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2003). The doctor also risks non-payment for a service rendered if 
he/she also deviates from protocols or if he/she does not request a pre-authorization 
for a planned procedure. 
 
Co-payments, for instance, have been documented as a driver of decreased drug 
utilization (Harris et al., 1990). This is mainly due to the fact that patients then shy 
away from out of pocket expenditures and opt for the funded alternative. 
The financial restrictions directly impact physician autonomy by risking 
reimbursement or indirectly due to patient out of pocket payments.  
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4. PRINCIPLED CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IMPEDIMENTS OF MEDICAL 
DOCTORS’ PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY WOULD BE MORALLY 
JUSTIFIED AND PRINCIPLED CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY 
WOULD NOT 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter I will identify and discuss principled conditions under which the 
impediment of medical doctor’s autonomy may and may not be morally justified. 
 
4.2. Principled Conditions Under Which the Autonomy of Medical Doctors could 
be Restricted 
 
I now turn my attention to two principled conditions under which it might be morally 
permissible for doctors’ autonomy to be limited.  These are, firstly,  the condition that 
the purpose of restricting professional autonomy is to prevent  futile treatment or a 
wastage of resources.  Secondly, autonomy might be justifiably restricted in the 
interests of the just distribution of resources. 
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4.2.1. Prevention of Futile or Wasteful Treatment 
 
Managed care organizations aim to curb the wasteful expenditures and spiraling cost 
and redistribute health resources where they are most needed at the most cost 
effective manner (Maynard and Bloor, 1998).   
 
In a world where resources are constrained it only makes sense that inefficient and 
wasteful health spending would result in resources not being available for medically 
necessary interventions.    
Mohindra (2007) defines medical futility as a state in which the intended medical care 
will neither result in a positive or negative health outcome for the patient.  
 
Futility is viewed from two perspectives.  It can either be qualitative or quantitative. 
Qualitative futility is when a treatment has a proven medical effect but there is no 
guarantee that the patient will be in a position to appreciate the benefit from the 
medical effect (Halliday, 1997). Quantitative futility relates to therapy that has been 
scientifically demonstrated to result in no benefit to the patient as it won’t have any 
desired medical effect on the patient (Dhai and McQuoid-Mason, 2011). This is well 
summed up by Ardagh (2000) who describes futility as treatment that will have no 
benefit. 
 
Impeding medical doctor’s professional autonomy to prevent futile care is the most 
palatable of the principled conditions and seems the most acceptable principled 
condition of them all. It is ethically justifiable that medical doctors should be not be in 
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a position where they could give futile treatment and this goes unquestioned due to a 
respect for the medical professional’s autonomy.  
 
 
Futile care is highlighted in end of life discussion debates. End of life discussions 
have been a topic of debate, especially in the setting of advanced directives (Higgs, 
1987). Medical doctors find themselves in a conundrum where their will to preserve 
life at all costs may be directly opposing that of the terminally ill patient who no 
longer wishes to suffer, this perhaps having been expressed in a form of a living will. 
The prevention of futile care under these circumstances will certainly result in the 
promotion of the patient’s autonomy if they have had their wishes expressed in such a 
document.   
 
Preventing futile care will result in the promotion of beneficence not only for the 
individual patient concerned but also to the rest of the insured population in the 
medical scheme. By limiting care which serves no medical benefit one can redirect 
those saved funds in paying for additional care to those who can benefit thus 
increasing access to benefits or care for all insured in the scheme 
Futile care could be viewed as a form of therapy that only prolongs life without 
medically benefiting the patient. In those patients who are terminally ill and suffering 
from pain, futile care could be viewed as therapy which may have an unintended 
consequence of prolonging suffering and pain in these patients (Campbell & 
McHaffie 1995). The prevention of futile care in these patients will result in the 
promotion of non-maleficence. 
 
 
30 
Preventing futile care will promote justice for all members in the medical scheme, as 
they will see more efficient use of their contributed premiums and less wastage.  
 
Limiting of physician autonomy in order to prevent futile care is morally justified as it 
will result in the promotion of patient autonomy, prevent prolonged patient suffering, 
result in reduced wastage and improved distribution of health resources.  
 
 
4.2.2. Justice in the Distribution of Resources 
 
The Council of Medical Schemes (2013) describes managed health care as necessary 
for the appropriate rationing of health resources.  
Resource distribution should achieve either increased patient inclusion within the 
healthcare system or an increase in benefits realized by patients or both (Emanuel, 
2000).  
 
Maynard (2001) mentions that in the resource constrained health sector rationing will 
have to take place and the ethical debate is not whether rationing should take place or 
not but rather which principles should be applied when rationing.  
 
Emanuel (2000) mentions four principles that need to be satisfied if the distribution of 
health care is to be deemed as being just. These include:  
1. The overall improvement of health should be the main goal.  
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2. Patients or members should be kept abreast and should know how resources 
are allocated and the justifications for these allocations. 
3. Patients or members should have the opportunity and should be involved in 
the decision making of which benefits will be granted and which wont be 
granted by the managed care organization 
4. Managed care organizations should be certain that resource allocation 
decisions should not take place under circumstances where they can be 
undully influnced . 
 
The just distribution of resources could result in the promotion of patient autonomy in 
the setting where the patients are fully infomed of all the treatment options and thus 
make a decision together with the treating physician on the best treatment plan. The 
just distribution of resources will have a positive contribution to beneficene as it could 
result in increased access to health for all members. The intentions of just distribution 
is to increase access to health care for all insured members however this should not be 
at the expense of health outcomes for the individual patient. Whilst redistribution of 
resources is good it is essential that patients still be afforded the health benefits that 
they have paid for. Promotion of justice for the patient would be to ensure that the 
patients also getting a level of care which is contractually due to them. The promotion 
of justice also requires that these actions serve their purpose, ie that there should be a 
realisation of cost containment and that there should be increased access to care. 
Konetzka et al. (2008) notes that initially managed care policies had resulted in 
control of hospital costs and there fore control of health care expenditure but this 
control was only short lived as hospitals gained further increasing bargaining power. 
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This was noted as hospitals no longer concerned themselves with managed care 
contract participation and in fact resulted in managed care resulting in a rise in health 
care costs.   
  
Limiting of physician autonomy is morally justified where it results in justice in the 
distribution of resources as there will be equitable distribution of resources and may 
even result in improved health outcomes for patients who are now recipients of the 
distributed health resources.  
 
4.3. Principled Conditions Under which the Autonomy of Medical Doctors should 
not be Restricted. 
 
I now turn my attention to principled conditions under which it might not be morally 
permissible for doctors’ autonomy to be limited.  These are, firstly, the condition that 
the limiting of medical doctors autonomy would result in reduced morale of medical 
doctors.  Secondly, the reduction of medical doctors autonomy might not be 
justifiable if it result in reduced patient outcomes.  Thirdly, the condition that the 
limiting of medical doctors autonomy would result in the reduction of trust in the 
patient doctor relationship. Fourthly, the reduction of medical doctors autonomy may 
not be justifiable where it results in a reduction of patient autonomy.  
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4.3.1. Reduction of doctor morale 
 
The implementation of managed care should not come at the cost of reducing the 
morale of doctors. It has been documented that doctors autonomy is an essential 
component of morale and a reduction in medical doctor morale results in poor patient 
outcomes, a decreased sense of satisfaction from patient s and decreased desire by the 
medical doctor to carry on in the practice of medicine (Hadley and Mitchell 2002).  
 
Reduced doctor morale may have an indirect negative effect on patient autonomy. 
Patient education in the doctors’ room forms an essential component of informed 
consent, allowing patients to play an increased participatory role in medical decision 
making and thus increasing their autonomy. The consequence of reduced doctor 
morale will result in the loss of health professional to the health sector; this in turn 
will result in increased strain to the doctors who are still in the system. This could 
possibly have a negative impact on the patient physician relationship resulting in 
suboptimal patient education taking place in the doctor’s rooms and negatively 
impacting on patient autonomy. Rogers (1999) describes beneficence as a moral duty 
which doctors have to their patients, a duty to do good to their patients. Whether it 
may be medical advice or a treatment plan, doctors have a duty to do what would be 
in the best interest of their patients. The consequences of reduced physician morale 
include negative health outcomes not only for individual patients but also for the 
general population due to the risk of decreased access to health care. These 
consequences would not serve any beneficence to patients. Thus actions that result in 
a reduced physician morale would not be able to satisfy patient beneficence. A 
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reduced morale may directly hamper a doctor’s ability to care for his patient. This 
may result in the doctor unintentionally harming his patient. To reduce maleficence 
there needs to be a limitation or minimizing of decisions that could result in the 
reduced morale of doctors. One of the consequences of reduced doctors morale is 
decreased medical doctor job satisfaction and the resultant consequence may be their 
complete loss from the health system (Scheurer et al., 2009). The loss of doctors 
morale could effectively result in decreased access to health care for the entire 
ensured population as there would be less and less doctors to assist them. Thus the 
reduction of morale could negatively impact on justice.   
  
The impediment of doctors’ autonomy which result in the reduction of doctors morale 
may not be ethically justifiable as the risk of job dissatisfaction and loss of doctors in 
the health system may not justify the ends of limiting costs in the health system. If 
anything as opposed to increasing access to heath-care for the managed care members 
it may instead limit access to health care for all members as there will be fewer 
doctors to deliver a health service.  
 
4.3.2. Suboptimal patient outcomes 
 
There has been a fear that managed care tools may result in suboptimal patient 
outcomes for instance where less effective treatment is selected due to managed care 
constraints on physician autonomy.  
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This has been highlighted amongst special groups that are more vulnerable to 
managed care tools, for example children, psychiatric patients and the elderly 
(Anderson, 1998).  
 
Special groups like those suffering with chronic disease can have improved health 
outcomes as long as managed care tools can avert the following that may result in 
poor health outcomes, such as: 
• Missed identification of worsening symptoms due to sub-optimal review 
• Poor patient education resulting in the patient being poorly educated on their 
condition and its complications 
• Cost saving measures that result in the overlooking of proven treatments or 
that encourage the use of less effective treatment strategies. 
• Overlooking the psychosocial aspects of disease (Wagner et al 1996) 
 
Baker and McClellan, 2001 notes that whilst managed care did not result in 
suboptimal or reduced patient outcomes as compared to traditional health funding it 
did how ever contribute to a negative perceived health outcome. This is due to the fact 
that for instance under managed care hospital admission length of stays may be 
reduced resulting in early discharge from hospital and continued care at home until 
the patient is fully healed.  
 
There is a fear that managed care tools would have a negative impact on health 
outcomes as service providers would put cost containment above patient care. 
Davidson et al (2003) has found that within certain special groups suffering from 
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chronic conditions managed care tools in fact contributed positively to health 
outcomes resulting in a reduced visit to the emergency department for the chronic 
conditions and better control of disease. 
 
There has been concern that health care rationing will result in suboptimal patient 
outcomes, as medically necessary treatment will be sacrificed for prudent spending. 
However Ubel and Goold (1998) mention that that the savings gained from limiting 
medically useful but not medical necessary treatment can be redistributed back into 
the health funding pool and result in funding of even more health benefits for the 
patients. This will result in an actual gain in health out comes for the patients. Thus 
health care rationing will rather contribute to improved general health benefits and 
outcomes for patients, thus promoting overall patient beneficence. Ethical delivery of 
healthcare requires the promotion of maleficence, and decisions that may result in 
suboptimal patient outcomes may not be ethically justifiable. The offering of a level 
of care that would result in substandard outcomes would not result in the promotion 
of maleficence and would be rejected. Patients have a contract with their managed 
care company for certain benefits that are promised to the patient. Promoting justice 
would require that the patient should realize the health benefits that he/she has paid 
for.  For the reasons stated, the limiting of patient autonomy may not be justifiable 
where it leads to suboptimal patient outcomes. 
 
 
4.3.3. Reduction of trust in the patient doctor relationship 
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Trust is an essential component of the patient’s health experience (Gilson, Palmer and 
Schneider 2005).  
The successful delivery of health care requires not only that some form of health 
service be supplied but that the end user (the patient) also accepts this; trust plays a 
fundamental role in achieving this (Gilson, 2003). It has been showed that a reduced 
level of trust results in poorer health seeking behavior by patients and worse of health 
outcomes in these patients as they are also least likely to follow medical instructions 
or stringent follow-up plans (Mohseni and Lindstrom, 2007). 
 
Hall et al (2002) conceptualize that general trust in physicians encapsulates 5 
domains:  
1. Fidelity, this relates to the doctors responsibility as a patient 
advocate and always putting his or her patient first. 
2. Competence, competence that the doctor is knowledgeable or an 
expert in the field, thus he/she can be entrusted to key health decisions.  
3. Honesty, the doctor is expected to be honest and not lie to his 
patient.   
4.Confidentiality, it is expected that the doctor will keep his patients’ 
secrets safe and would only use that information when clinically 
warranted 
5. Global trust, a combination of the above domains that results in the 
fabric which that trust is interwoven in. 
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Trust plays an essential role in the doctor patient relationship and has an impact on 
health seeking behavior of patients. Where trust is reduced patients are less like to 
seek medical advice on time, and rather present their complaints to medical doctors 
when their disease is at an advanced stage. By reducing trust one essentially limits 
patients autonomy. This perhaps is best captured by Entwistle et al. (2010) who 
describe group of vulnerable patients who, though they may be competent, may not be 
able to fully exercise their autonomy due to certain factors e.g. patients who are 
uncertain of which treatment option to choose, patients who are not able to back 
themselves or those who want to avoid having to blame themselves should their 
chosen treatment option fail. In such patients a reduction in trust in the doctor patient 
relationship will result in a negative impact on their autonomy. As previously noted 
one of the consequences of reduced trust in the patient doctor relationship is the 
reduced health seeking behavior of patients and thus resulting in them presenting 
when their condition is at an advanced state. The reduction of trust will result in no 
beneficence to the patient. Following on from the previously mentioned statements 
the reduction of trust would equally have a negative impact on maleficence. A 
reduced trust in the patient doctor relationship has a negative impact on patient 
autonomy, beneficence and maleficence. As a consequence of these it would be hard 
to see justice for patients prevailing. Poor health outcomes as a result of poor health 
seeking behavior would not result in justice for patients. A reduced trust in the patient 
doctor relationship would have negative implication for justice for patients. 
 
Actions that have a negative impact on trust between the patient and his treating 
doctor would be attacking the very soul of the patient doctor relationship and thus 
threaten the delivery of health care as a whole. Managed care principles that threaten 
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trust between doctors and their patients would have far reaching consequences for the 
delivery of health care as a whole and in fact may rather have a negative impact on 
cost containment when one considers that the health seeking behavior is modified by 
trust with the doctor patient relationship. Poor health seeking behavior results in 
patients presenting far more advanced disease which may much more expansive to 
manage. 
   
Limiting medical doctor autonomy would not be morally justifiable if it resulted in a 
reduction of trust in the patient doctor relationship as this would negatively impact on 
the patient doctor relationship and result in a near collapse of the health system. 
 
 
 
4.3.4. Erosion of patient autonomy 
 
The patient doctor relationship has evolved from the historic paternal relationship 
of old to one where there has been encouragement of greater patient participation 
in treatment planning (Buetow, 1998). This may present a problem where patients 
may disagree about the treatment plan rather requesting the newest treatment 
which they feel may be better, an example is in the setting of drug company direct 
marketing to patients which results in patients demanding the newest drug as they 
perceive that this would be the best for them (Graber & Tansey, 2005). This may 
create a situation where there could be a clash of treatment plans and the doctor as 
a respecter of patient autonomy yielding to the patient’s wishes. Increased patient 
 
40 
involvement in decision-making could have a positive influence on patient 
outcomes. Patients take ownership of their conditions and would be more 
involved in the treatment strategies. A more involved patient would have better 
understanding of their condition and would thus have improved health-seeking 
behavior. A more involved patient would also have better compliance as they are 
far better informed of the consequences of poor compliance to the agreed to 
treatment plan. By creating an environment where there is a promotion of patient 
autonomy there would be an enhancement on beneficence to the patient.   
It goes to say that the erosion of patient autonomy would have negative 
consequences for health delivery and would go against the legal and ethical 
obligations of the treating doctor, which are to promote patient autonomy. For 
these reasons the limiting of medical doctors autonomy that results in the erosion 
of patient autonomy could not be justifiable. 
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5. NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF MANAGED CARE TOOLS  
In this chapter we will look at some of the managed care tools and give examples of 
circumstances where they would be ethically justifiable or not justifiable. 
  
5.1. Drug Formularies 
 
Super-bugs have been a major source of morbidity and mortality for patients who 
have been admitted to hospitals. These super-bugs are extremely resistant to widely 
available antibiotics. These super-bugs infect patients during their admission in the 
hospital, mainly in the ICU setting. The growth of these super-bugs has been mainly 
attributed to incorrect antibiotic prescription practices by treating physicians. The 
antibiotic stewardship program was a form of drug formulary specifically for 
antibiotics that was introduced in an attempt to modify physician-prescribing behavior 
to reduce the growth of the super-bug formulation (Reed et al., 2013). This functions 
by restricting access to antibiotics that may not be indicted. This a great example of 
an ethical drug formulary which has centered in its existence patient care and 
outcomes for the entire population.  In this instance the implementation of the 
formulary will result in a reduction of futile expenditure of antibiotics that are not 
indicated. Under these circumstances drug formulary enforcement resulting in the 
limitation of professional autonomy would be morally permissible.  
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Drug side effects are a source of serious morbidity for patients and can be serious 
enough to force patients to completely withdraw from the prescribed drugs as the side 
effects start to be greater than the pharmaco-therapeutic benefits of the drugs 
(Sathasivam and Lecky, 2008). Restricted formularies become unethical where the 
treating doctor is then forced to persist with drug side effects or to try alternative 
drugs within the particular class in hope that the patient does not react to the different 
brand generic. This is done in order to protect the patient from the financial penalties 
that come with drugs that fall outside of those within the formulary. The enforcement 
of drug formularies on patients who are suffering from adverse side effects would be 
deemed to be ethically unjustifiable as it would result in suboptimal patient outcomes 
and risks an erosion of trust between the medical doctor and patients. The 
enforcement of drug formularies resulting in the limitation of professional autonomy 
under these circumstances would not ethically justifiable.  
 
 
5.2. Treatment Protocols 
 
There may be groups of doctors who are not keeping up to date with the latest 
evidence on how to manage a particular condition and still offering treatments which 
have now proven to be suboptimal (O'Dowd and Wilson, 1991). Clinical freedom 
would suggest that the doctors be left to continue with this line of care that may no 
longer be benefiting their patients. The introduction of a treatment protocol based on 
the latest evidence would be ethically justified as a tool to encourage the doctors to 
adopt the new standard of care which in the end not only realizes cost savings to the 
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members of the scheme but also in improved health outcomes. The enforcement of 
treatment protocols would then result in the eradication of old and outdated practices 
that may no longer benefit the patient thus promoting the prevention of futile care. 
The enforcement of treatment protocols under these circumstances would also satisfy 
the promotion of just distribution of resources as funds become more efficiently spent 
on scientifically backed outcomes. 
Patients however are not a uniform group of people and all will respond individually 
to different therapeutic interventions. A challenge for treatment protocols is patients 
who are non-responders to the protocol interventions. A protocol that does not 
consider possible non-responders is ethically not acceptable. Patients and their 
treating doctors cannot be forced to continue with therapy that does not work for the 
sake of the protocol. The treatment protocol in non-responders would result in 
suboptimal patient outcomes as patients would be getting treatment that is not 
effective, this would result in an erosion of trust in the patient doctor relationship, as 
patients would be improving clinically.  Treatment protocols where patients are not 
responding may also reduce doctors’ morale as they are forced to continue with 
treatment plans that are not working. In this instance the limitation of medical 
doctors’ autonomy through treatment protocols would not be morally justified. 
 
5.3. Utilization Management 
 
Preauthorization processes fall under utilization review. 
This process involves getting approval first from the managed care organization 
before a treatment plan can be admitted. The preauthorization process is ethically 
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acceptable under cases of inappropriate admissions. These may include unnecessary 
hospitalization or inappropriate levels of care for admitted patients (Antón et al., 
2007). An example would be the use of a private or isolation ward in the hospital. 
Sometimes patients choose these isolation wards not out of medical necessity 
(medical need for isolation due to a highly infectious condition) but rather because 
they want privacy. Their conditions could be managed in a standard ward. Under 
these circumstances the use if the preauthorization process is warranted as 
unnecessary hospital admission costs could be prevented for a level of care that is not 
medically indicated. The utilization management process under these circumstances 
would satisfy the promotion of justice in the distribution of care. 
Hospital admissions and some surgical procedures are amongst the services that need 
preauthorization prior to a patient being able to have access to those benefits, added 
further to that may also be certain cost drugs. Whilst the intention of this process is to 
prevent wasteful expenditure there are however certain circumstances where this 
process may have undesired effects include severely ill psychiatric patients. Farley 
(2010) mentions how the preauthorization process may result in adverse 
consequences for the patient: 
i. Poor treatment compliance as patients within this group do not necessarily 
respond identically to the drugs thus there is a lot of trial and error with 
individual patients to find the drug that works. If working drugs are then 
subjected to preauthorization process patients and their treating doctors may 
be forced to try alternative drugs first prior to pre-authorization being 
approved.  
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ii. The process to gain the preauthorization for a particular drug may be too 
cumbersome for the treating doctor resulting in a decreased likelihood that the 
motivation will be correctly filled in and thus rejection of the authorization 
request.   
This example demonstrates how the preauthorization process can be unethical as it 
negatively impacts patient care, may in fact result in increased costs for the scheme as 
patients conditions worsens resulting in increased need for health services.  
Utilization management under these circumstances will result in suboptimal patient 
outcomes and a reduction in medical doctors morale as their time is consumed by 
administrative process and not actual patient care. 
 
5.4. Preferred Provider Networks 
 
Preferred provider networks involve network contracts that are developed by a 
managed care where there is a preferred payment rate for health services for their 
members. The networks may involve general practitioners, specialists and hospitals. 
Scheme members are encouraged to use these referral systems for their health needs. 
In the ideal situation the member would see his preferred network general 
practitioner. The general practitioner would assess his patient and if necessary will 
refer the patient to the medically appropriate specialist. The specialist would assess 
the patient and if necessitated admit the patient for further in hospital care in the 
network hospital.  Under this ideal situation patient care would not be compromised 
and cost savings would be realized whilst the patient underwent standard process to 
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receive their health care. Under these circumstances the preferred provider network 
would be morally justifiable, as it would satisfy the just distribution of resources.  
There is however certain circumstances that would result in the enforcement of 
provider networks as unethical. These include an emergency situation where there is 
no realistic time for a patient to seek a network referral specialist or hospital. Under 
these circumstances patient care and outcomes would be compromised if medically 
necessary healthcare were to be stopped so that the appropriate provider could be 
contacted. Another circumstances is where there are no appropriate specialists within 
the network. It may not be possible for a medical scheme to have contractual 
relationships with specialists in all fields. It would not be ethically justifiable if 
patients were forced to only consult within their network when the required health 
professional is not available, this again would result in not suboptimal but rather 
inappropriate patient care. Both these circumstances bring to light how the 
enforcement of preferred provider networks could be ethically unjustifiable, as they 
would result in suboptimal patient outcomes and a reduction of medical doctors’ 
morale.  
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6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Limited resources are a reality in the private health system. From this defined pool of 
resources members need to access benefits for their health needs. Spiraling health care 
costs have posed a threat to these benefits risking limiting access to health care for 
scheme members, as more has to be done with even less. 
The rise in health care costs has been largely attributed to actions of medical doctors 
who were acting without restraint. Managed care programs were thus introduced in an 
attempt to control the spiraling health care costs by reducing medical doctors 
autonomy. 
Whilst the prize for limiting costs is increased access to health care for members there 
are however anticipated consequences of a reduction in medical doctors autonomy 
that include a reduced medical doctor moral, suboptimal patient care, increased work 
dissatisfaction and a loss of doctors to the health system. 
 
Some of the managed care tools that were identified include the use of drug 
formularies, treatment protocols, utilization reviews and provider networks. 
 
We identified principled conditions where the limitation of doctors’ autonomy as a 
result of these managed care could be morally justified. These include where the 
implementation of the tools would result in a just distribution of resources and a 
limitation of medically futile treatment. 
However principled conditions where these managed care tools would not ethically 
justified included where they would result in adverse patient outcomes, where they 
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result in a loss of medical doctors moral or where they result in reduced trust in the 
patient doctor relationship. 
 
DeMarco 2005, offers an approach to the moral dilemma where there are two 
competing moral interests both justified but where only one can be served. Using the 
example of a doctor who has to choose between breaking a promise to his child and 
attending to a critically ill patient DeMarcor offers an alternative that whilst only one 
of these interests may be served by applying the mutuality principle, there now is a 
moral obligation by the doctor to enhance both interests in future by thinking up of 
solutions which would avoid the same dilemma from taking place. 
 
 Having normatively assessed these principles in light of the four ethical principles of 
health care delivery, autonomy, beneficence, maleficence and justice we are able to 
come up with the following recommendations: 
 
6.1. Improving Just Distribution of Resources 
 
4 principles are mentioned by Emmanuel (2000) that we can adapt to make 
resource allocation more just: 
  (i)  Health improvement must be the first aim 
(ii)  The individual patients and members should be well informed 
of benefits 
(iii)  Members should be given the opportunity to consent to benefit 
allocations that are made to them. 
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(iv) Those making decisions on benefit allocation should do their 
best avoid potential conflicts of interests. 
 
6.2. Improving Patient Education. 
 
Patient autonomy is central to the delivery of healthcare and enjoys protection 
in law. Enhancing patient autonomy not only involves informing patients of 
the medical condition possible treatment strategies but also will invariably 
need education on social justice. Graber and Tansy (2005) suggest that this 
should form part of the consenting process during the consultation. It is also 
recommended that the managed care company also take an active role in 
teaching their members on social responsibility and their health plan benefits. 
This would result in less conflict in the doctors’ rooms; aid the doctor patient 
relationship and still lead to increased cost savings.  
 
6.3. Improving Trust in the Doctor Patient Relationship  
 
Managed care organizations though third parties in this doctor patient 
relationship can foster the trust in this relationship by adopting a more open 
policy on communication of the basis of treatment of cover and the extent of 
cover from the purchased product (Pover G et al., 2004). It is advisable that 
funders not merely make rules about what is covered and not covered but 
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should rather involve a collective discussion between funders, patients and 
doctors on what would be a basic standard of care which should be funded. 
This approach will reduce the burden on medical doctors to ration allow them 
rather to focus on making sure that this standard is met (Baily, 2003). 
 
6.4. Improving Trust Between Medical Professionals and Managed Care 
Companies.  
 
The relationship between treating medical doctors and managed care 
companies can be improved as suggested by Randel et al, (2001) by managed 
care companies applying a more open approach on funding policies and reason 
for coverage. This would lead to less frustrations and take away the perceived 
wall of secrecy surrounding these decision.  
This will be essential in improving trust between medical professionals and 
managed care companies. Managed care companies should be more open 
about their decision making process. An additional benefit of improved doctor 
satisfaction is that even patient satisfaction will be improved (Linn et al., 
1985). 
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